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Summary 
This article explores state efforts to safeguard national history and identity in Putin’s Russia. It is argued 
that a process of selective securitization has been taking place, whereby elite actors have defined certain 
(but not all) aspects of Russia’s history and identity as vital and existentially threatened interests that 
need to be forcefully defended. This has paved the way for wide reaching state policy on the Great 
Patriotic War and given security actors an important role in its formulation. While the narrative of 
victory and unity surrounding the Great Patriotic War has become subject to securitization, state policy 
on the more contentious issue of Stalin’s dictatorship has been much more ambiguous. When it comes 
to Stalin, the state has not sought to unify the population behind a common narrative, but rather to 
accommodate the value pluralism present among Russian elites and in society at large. 
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In May 2016, a few hundred teachers and education officials took part in a conference hosted by the 
Moscow regional parliament. The theme was ‘history teaching as a national security issue’, and the 
conference was part of a larger cycle of events devoted to the patriotic education of the young -- how to 
make people love and be proud of their country and its history. The main speaker, a professor of history 
at one of Moscow’s universities, painted a picture of Russia as being the target of a U.S.-directed 
information war with the ultimate aim of breaking up and destroying the Russian Federation. His core 
message was that the current official Russian ban on state ideology makes it impossible to use history 
as a defensive weapon in this information war. Not being able to defend Russian historical science 
against the enemy onslaught would lead to the disintegration of historical consciousness and, ultimately, 
‘the death of Russia’.1 
A similar sense of drama characterizes an article published on the website of the Russian 
Institute for Strategic Studies, a think-tank close to the Kremlin, entitled Threats to Russia’s Cultural 
Security in the Context of Teaching in Schools.2 The authors warn against ‘liberal ideology’ in history 
textbooks, which subverts patriotism by highlighting the dark pages in Russian history. They conclude 
with a stark warning: 
If the current state of history teaching in schools continues, Russia will run the risk, 
in the next 10-15 years, of losing her sovereignty and being split up into several 
dozens or hundreds of territories that will inevitably fight each other. This is the end 
goal of the internal as well as the external enemies of the Russian Federation.3 
These statements vividly illustrate the main argument of this article: In Putin’s Russia, elite 
actors have subjected history in particular -- and national identity in general -- to a process of 
securitization.  
Securitization occurs when state and other influential actors (‘securitizing actors’) define some 
issue as a vital interest under existential threat, implying that someone must take forceful action in its 
defence. Our argument, that Russian elites have set out to securitize Russian history and identity, 
complements that of Jardar Østbø, who perceptively analyses the ‘moral turn’ under Putin, arguing that 
the ongoing ‘securitization of spiritual-moral values’ has become a way for the regime to ‘create and 
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bolster the perception that the Russian state is existentially threatened’, in order to keep the population 
in ‘survival mode’.4 To securitize an issue means to bring it under political control -- to remove it from 
‘the realm of ordinary public deliberation, discussion and debate’.5 In this, it deviates from politicization, 
as also underscored by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (the creators of the securitization framework).6 
Indeed, politicization and securitization may in certain contexts signify opposite phenomena, 
particularly in open liberal democracies. In the case of the authoritarian and security-dominated political 
environment of Russia, however, one could see the two terms as more closely related. 
We also argue that the securitization of history in Putin’s Russia has been selective: not all 
important historical topics have been getting the security treatment. While the state clearly seeks to 
control the Great Patriotic War narrative of unity and victory, other politically salient topics have 
escaped a full-fledged securitization. Our case in point is the issue of Stalin’s dictatorship, on which 
policy has been fluctuating and indecisive. When it comes to this contentious and divisive topic, Putin’s 
history policy has not sought to enforce the ‘party line’, but rather to accommodate the value pluralism 
and differing interpretations prevalent among Russian elites.7 
The article proceeds as follows. After a brief clarification of the securitization concept, we 
review domestic and international contextual factors that gave rise to the securitization of history and 
identity well before the ‘morality turn’ of 2012 and the subsequent sharpened conflict with Western 
powers since 2014.8 Second, we move on to examine how Russian authorities have securitized history 
and identity, particularly with respect to post-2012 speeches and security doctrines. We then show how 
the state has moved to safeguard the official narrative of the Great Patriotic War. Finally, we review 
policies and statements that have contradicted the official line of patriotic history policy, particularly 
with regard to Stalinism. We interpret these deviations as pragmatic concessions to alternative visions 
of Russian history and identity, corresponding to competing (or complementing) political agendas -- 




 The Securitization of National Identity  
The examples provided in the introduction illustrate how Russia is going through a process of identity 
securitization.9 For its tendency to legitimize its style of government by reference to vital security 
threats, contemporary Russia makes a strong case for applying securitization perspectives on a number 
of policy themes.10 State efforts to safeguard identity and history have gained momentum throughout 
the Putin period. Identifying the beginning of this tendency to a single event or year would be artificial; 
our study instead identifies a subtle development going all the way back to the development of the first 
state programs of patriotic education in the late 1990s. New since that time is not the existence of 
securitizing agents, who have been present all along, but their increasing political prominence and 
impact. 
Russia’s identity securitizers are not simply identifying a fundamental threat to Russian identity 
and historical consciousness. Often, they also claim that Russia’s enemies have already done much 
harm. Following this, efforts to secure current identity is often coupled with reactionary attempts to roll 
back harmful influence and restore a purported ‘natural’ identity. Securitization represents a search for 
a stable identity, regardless of its existence in the first place.11 
Importantly, the securitization of identity opens the door for emergency measures to save, or 
restore, it: Large-scale identity programs, far-fetched narratives in history textbooks, legislating history 
laws, and the involvement of military and security agencies in policymaking and implementation.12 As 
will be illustrated in the following, securitizing a policy area not only provides an impulse for additional 
state attention, but also helps manoeuvre decision making into the hands of security experts. In line with 
Wilhelmsen, we contend that ‘securitizing moves’ do not lead directly to emergency measures in a linear 
fashion, but merely reproduce and strengthen a securitizing discourse already present. This securitizing 
discourse, moreover, does not cause radical state measures, but changes the conditions under which 




The Context of Securitization: Domestic Moral Crisis and Foreign Rival Narratives  
State efforts to securitize national identity and history are nothing new in Russia. 19th century tsars 
defended the doctrine of ‘Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality’ in order to safeguard a particular 
conception of Russian identity; Khrushchev warned that historians were ‘dangerous people’ who had to 
be ‘directed’;14 other Soviet leaders considered even western pop music and jeans as threats to national 
sovereignty. The breakup of the USSR created a new dynamic around the question of identity and 
security, a development propelled by two main factors. First, the economic, ideological and moral 
disintegration of Russia in the early 1990s led to widespread elite concerns about the future of the 
Russian nation. Such concerns prompted increased political attention to national history and resurrected 
the old tsarist idea of official Russian patriotism. Second, the collapse of the Soviet order brought about 
a wave of nation-building and active state policies of history in other post-Communist countries. 
Because these new national narratives were largely in conflict with their Russian equivalent, and 
therefore perceived as a threat, they had a significant impact upon Russian policies. In the following, 
we deal with these two topics in order. 
In the first half of the 1990s, not only the Soviet state, but also its ideology and historical myths 
crumbled. The years of 1990 and 1991 were marked by ‘outspoken and unqualified condemnations’ of 
the Soviet past, attacking the core myths of Soviet history.15 While some historians stubbornly stuck to 
the old narratives, the Soviet collapse and the opening of Soviet archives paved the way for an 
unprecedented and public historical examination of what had earlier been taboos -- the dark sides of 
Soviet rule. The outpouring of critical perspectives on the Soviet past led to a conservative reaction 
which still characterizes official patriotic discourse, with talk of combating ‘historical masochism’ and 
counteracting attempts by Russia’s enemies to ‘falsify’ and ‘deheroize’ its history.16 
‘When the ‘bomb of westernism’ exploded in Russia’, wrote Aleksandr Zinoviev, ‘it hollowed 
out not only the governmental, economic, ideological and cultural spheres, but also the very human 
material of society.’17 As a result of the prolonged crisis associated with the liberalization and 
privatization of Russia -- marked by corruption, political manipulation and rampant social problems -- 
the common disillusion with Soviet ideology was soon followed by embitterment with western ideals. 
Understandably, the crisis also resulted in reduced sentiments of love and respect for the Russian nation 
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and state, so fundamentally in disorder and without a functioning ideology to legitimize it. Problems 
were further exacerbated by political fragmentation and a humiliating military defeat in Chechnya. 
Domestic production of consumer products dropped, as did Russian productions for TV and cinema.18 
Often, moral degradation and a sense of lost dignity were linked to foreign influence. As a writer 
lamented: ‘The social values of the Santa Barbara ‘heroes’ are more important for us than our own 
national values and passions.’19 ‘The process of national degradation’, warned a Russian sociologist, ‘is 
already a real danger sounding the alarms of the whole society.’20 
While the Yeltsin camp certainly distanced itself from the Soviet past, and consistently worked 
to undermine the political impact of the Communist Party, Yeltsin himself was reportedly ‘quite alien’ 
to the idea of using history as a political instrument.21 The liberals found it difficult to engage in a full-
fledged history policy along anti-Soviet lines, since any active identity policy would be associated with 
the regime they despised.22 Following the liberals’ defeat in the 1995 Duma elections, however, the 
Yeltsin government realized that an ideological shift was necessary. Although the liberal agenda was by 
no means abandoned, it was increasingly mixed with traditional patriotic ideas. In the second half of the 
1990s, Yeltsin set down a commission to ponder on ‘the Russian idea’, reintroduced military parades 
on Victory Day and made moves towards the political centre to avoid excessive polarization.23 In his 
last term as president, Yeltsin supported an initiative from the Ministry of Defence to formulate a 
traditionalist policy concept of patriotic education.24 At the same time, private enterprises increasingly 
realized the commercial prospects of the patriotic brand.25 The following years, patriotic history writing 
became increasingly important to the authorities to induce national pride among the population. As 
international tensions grew under Putin, securitizing approaches gradually became more salient. 
Securitizing statements became more frequent at higher levels of politics, and eventually came to 
influence state policy, as we shall see. 
Putin’s turn to a more assertive history policy and further promotion of Russian patriotism must 
be understood in the context of the perceived de-ideologization and moral crisis of the 1990s. Consider 
Putin’s address to the Federation Council in 2012: The dismantling of Soviet ideology was necessary, 
he admitted, but in the process, Russia lost a part of itself: ‘We ended up throwing out the baby with the 
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bath water.’26 To save the country from imminent collapse and make Russia great again, national self-
respect had to be kick-started, an idea central to official identity discourse under Putin. 
Russia was not the only country that started intensifying official policies of history in the first 
decade of the 2000s. On the contrary, Russia was part of a wave of renewed interest of post-communist 
states in their national histories. The narratives of other countries, however, often conflicted with the 
Russian. Indeed, the elites of many newborn regimes framed Russia and the Soviet Union as the main 
antagonists in their national history writing. The victim narrative has been central to many countries 
formerly under Soviet influence -- the past is presented as suffering under ‘the evil intentions of 
foreigners’.27 Ukrainian history textbooks, for instance, have been described as emphasizing Russian 
‘violence, cruel policies and destruction’.28 Particularly in the cases of Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic 
countries, conflictive historical narratives affected Russian policymaking under Putin and Medvedev. 
Tendencies in these countries to equate Nazi and Soviet occupation, for instance, played directly into 
Russia’s establishment of a special history commission ‘to counteract attempts to falsify history to the 
detriment of Russia’s interests’ in 2009 and the introduction of a new article in the Criminal Code, 
initiatives we discuss below.29 
While some state initiatives were implemented in post-communist countries already in the early 
1990s, the policies often reached their climax only later, coinciding with renewed Russian attention to 
historical narratives. They also took many of the same forms as Russian policies did: patriotic programs, 
erection or demolition of monuments, writing new history textbooks, establishing institutes of national 
remembrance, creating of museums under political patronage and passing history laws.30 
Because the historical narratives were often discordant, the increasingly active policies of 
history in these and other states led to what became known as the ‘history wars’ of post-communist 
Europe. Russia several times clashed with Poland over the memory of the massacre in the Katyn forest 
in 1940, and the relationship between Ukraine and Russia was rife with historical disputes well before 
the escalation of conflict in 2014, not least with regard to the famines under Stalin and the role of the 
Banderite movement in the Second World War. Quarrels over Estonia’s monument landscape 
culminated in 2007 with the removal of a Stalin-era bronze soldier from central Tallinn, unleashing riots 
and repeated cyberattacks against Estonian state institutions. The examples are not unique. 
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In a setting where both parties see their narratives as sacred, quarrels about purported historical 
truths are doomed to become a dialogue of the deaf. As pointed out by the Estonian researcher Maria 
Mälksoo, these confrontations between neighbouring states show how securitization of historical 
memory by no means increases the feeling of security in the countries in question. Instead, the ‘history 
wars’ replicate the classical security dilemma on the arena of national identity: Because the securitized 
national narratives often are in mismatch with each other, one state’s identity security is seen as 
detrimental to the identity security of others. This again leaves all participants in the game of security 
fundamentally insecure and mobilized for a continued battle of historical narratives. In this way, the 
securitization of historical memory ‘tends to reproduce insecurities and reinstate historical animosities 
instead of alleviating them’.31 
An Official Discourse of History and Identity under Siege 
A mentality of identity siege is salient at the highest level of government. Upon becoming president, 
Putin immediately made it clear that he wanted to restore national pride by using Russian history. At 
this point in time, national history should not be considered securitized. Yet, the still limited discourse 
of patriotic education contained strong elements of alarmism, not least among military officials.32 
Following the above-mentioned ‘history wars’, officially voiced concerns about hostile forces plotting 
to destroy Russian historical consciousness, national character and cultural sovereignty became more 
common.33 Alarmism in identity and security issues became a prominent feature in the 2012 ‘morality 
turn’ in official discourse, and identity security and the fight against historical falsification are today 
included in official doctrines. In the words of the Russian philosopher Alexander Rubtsov, ‘life is 
becoming more and more ideological, while ideology is becoming more historical’.34 The development 
of today’s approach has been gradual, from employing patriotic history writing as a political tool from 
the late 1990s, to an increasingly securitizing approach since about 2007 and even more so since the 
beginning of Putin’s third presidential term in 2012. 
2012 was a notable year in Putin’s own adoption of a securitized identity discourse. In his 
address to the Federal Assembly that year, Putin stated: ‘If the nation is unable to preserve and reproduce 
itself, if it loses vital references and ideals, it does not need an external enemy because it will fall apart 
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on its own.’35 The statement signalled that Russian national identity is not only a matter of moral or 
cultural security -- Russians losing themselves and turning into something they are not. It is also a matter 
of security in the traditional sense: National identity secures the integrity of state territory. If the nation 
disintegrates, so does the state. In another 2012 speech, Putin warned that ‘the distortion of national, 
historical and moral consciousness has led to catastrophe for entire states, to their weakness 
and ultimate demise, the loss of sovereignty and fratricidal wars’.36 In his 2013 Unity Day speech, the 
warning was even more direct: ‘[We must] realize how great an abyss of ruin and loss we face if we 
neglect national interests and forget our moral foundations and unique identity’.37 Key state bodies have 
followed up on Putin’s alarmism. In a 2016 Presidential Security Council meeting, participants 
reportedly discussed how historical memory has become an object of ‘targeted destructive acts from 
foreign state institutions and international organizations to fulfil geopolitical interests in line with anti-
Russian policies’.38 
The actors cited above invoke a sense of urgency by reference to the current tensions and 
alarmist visions of the near future. Urgency, of course, is permanent, since identity by definition is fluid 
and changing.39 For purposes of nation building, however, the Russian national character is presented 
as a semi-permanent feature distinguishing the Russian civilization from the rest. This representation is 
key for mobilizing support for the securitization of identity. Yet, ‘since identities are always in the 
making […] the promise of stability in securitization practices is illusory’.40 
The degree to which history and identity security has become an integrated part of state policy 
is visible in the mark it leaves on key state security documents. In the 2015 National Security Strategy, 
for instance, several passages mention ideological threats, such as threats against the ‘cultural 
sovereignty’ of Russia, foreign countries ‘falsifying history’, and the ‘erosion of traditional Russian 
spiritual and moral values […] by means of external cultural and information expansion’.41 The 2014 
Military Doctrine listed the undermining of ‘historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions related to the 
defence of the Motherland’ under the heading “main internal military dangers”.42  
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Enforcing the Memory of the War 
Central to the securitization of history and identity is the Great Patriotic War, which through extensive 
commemorative and nation-building practices has arguably transformed ‘into a master narrative of the 
Russian national identity’.43 Even explicitly civilian (grazhdanskii) patriotism is permeated by this 
theme.44 Notably, the Great Patriotic War is not identical to the Second World War, but refers to the 
Russian war against Nazi Germany in the years 1941-1945. The Soviet tradition of focusing on the Great 
Patriotic War tends to downplay the much more contentious Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939, the 
subsequent Soviet invasions and annexations, the large-scale repressions against real and imagined 
enemies in the annexed/occupied territories, and the contribution of Russia’s allies to the victory.45 
The epic story of the War transcends ethnic and religious divisions, glorifying both state and 
nation. It was for these unifying qualities it was exploited in full by Soviet propaganda since the 1960s, 
and still is today. As President Putin himself has noted: the memory of the victory makes ‘all, all 
disagreements -- ideological and generational’ disappear and ‘unites and reconciles everyone in 
Russia’.46 The War serves as a positive focal point to anesthetize the nation against its bad memories -- 
the ambiguities and troublesome aspects of Russian history where the people all too often has fallen 
victim to the state itself.  
Given the huge scale and impact of the Second World War for both Russian and world history, 
a certain priority granted to the war years is of course only to be expected. Hyperbolic representations 
of national heroism are also commonplace in popular accounts of military history elsewhere. As Ernest 
Renan puts it, ‘getting history wrong is part of being a nation’.47 Critical observers, however, have 
criticized both the ritual content and the scale of the Russian commemoration, described as a state-driven 
‘cult’ and a ‘national obsession’ taking mythical proportions.48 In the words of Alexei Miller, ‘by taking 
advantage of the administrative and financial resources of the state, the dominant political forces carry 
out the ideological indoctrination of society in the realm of historical consciousness and collective 
memory’.49 The ability to bring about this change was strengthened by the gradual securitization of 
history and national identity: On the pretext of countering alleged threats against the Russian nation, the 
political leadership displayed an increasing willingness to employ heavy-handed tools to promote its 
identity templates and preferred narratives on selected topics. In the field of military history, this has 
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been particularly evident. In the following, we will examine the policy of patriotic education, before 
looking at even more direct means of upholding state narratives of the war. 
Patriotic Education: Russia’s Official Love Potion  
Under the banner of patriotism, Putin regime has been trying to rally the multi-ethnic population behind 
a common national idea, a certain set of values and support of the Russian state. Appearing as an 
important ideological focal point for identity discourse already in the mid-1990s, the patriotic brand has 
been actively harnessed by state authorities. To circumvent political opponents mobilizing nationalist 
sentiment against the regime, the political leadership has rather successfully attempted to take control 
over the ‘strategical tag’ of patriotism, using it for its own purposes.50 The patriotic centrism of Putin’s 
regime is, in other words, driven by a mix of consensus-seeking and top-down initiatives. Since the 
Crimea annexation, official patriotism has arguably come as close to a state ideology as it could without 
violating the constitutional ban. In 2016, Putin declared in a strikingly authoritative manner that Russia’s 
unifying ideas was patriotism, and that it could be no other.51 
The main programmatic drive of official patriotism is the State Program of Patriotic Education 
of Russian Citizens (State Program), whose main features are the official Concept of Patriotic Education 
and regular five-year plans with both policy content and financial set-up for specific projects. 52 The first 
five-year plan commenced in 2001; the fourth and current runs from 2016 to 2020. The sources of 
patriotism envisioned in the State Program are highly traditional -- almost exclusively centred on the 
military and military history of Russia. Among the concrete projects supported by the five-year plans, a 
great many publications, conferences, exhibitions, competitions and festive events commemorate past 
military achievements. The Great Patriotic War consistently gets the lion’s share of attention. The 
programmatic texts also serve as a foundation for other plans and activities conducted around the 
country, including both regional plans and various local initiatives.53 
By means of military glory of the past and present, Russia is supposed to tackle a whole range 
of threats against the state and nation. The sense of sustained crisis has manifested in aims to restore 
Russian spirituality and secure and stabilize the country. Only with the most recent five-year plan, the 
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picture of a Russia in distress is finally fading into the background. The emphasis on military traditions 
and history, however, remains and even expands. 
Importantly, the policy makers also intend to counter radical ethno-nationalism and build 
friendship among the various ethnic groups of Russia, so crucial for the Russian federative model. In 
practice, however, the multi-ethnic character of Russian patriotism has been challenged. One study, for 
instance, documented how Tatar organizations used “patriotic state funds” to promote distinctly ethno-
national perspectives.54 Purported multi-confessionality is also at risk, with the Russian Orthodox 
Church taking a dominant role in a great many of the activities.55 According to J. Paul Goode’s research, 
the opaque character of patriotism frequently leads to a relapse into ethnic characteristics when Russians 
are asked to elaborate on its meaning. To a considerable extent, Good argues, Russian patriotism is 
“patriotic in form, but nationalist in content”.56 Yet to a certain extent, the need to transcend ethnic and 
religious identities can explain the elevated position of the military and military history in Russian 
history policy. 
While Russia’s official basis for patriotism has deservingly been criticized for overly vague 
language, some general aims are set down. First, the programmatic texts explicitly frame the inducement 
of traditional patriotism as a matter of military prestige and defence capabilities. Echoing Soviet 
experiences, the ideological indoctrination is practiced side by side with military training. The logic of 
ideological training in this context is that real Russian patriots would love to join the armed forces and 
sacrifice themselves defending the Fatherland. In more practical terms, the Russian Armed forces hope 
to get better and more recruits, both conscripts and soldiers on contract.57 The scholarly attention to 
patriotic education has tended to highlight this feature of the program, arguably at the expense of its 
ideological purposes.58 A second important goal of patriotic education is the moral revival and ‘spiritual 
rebirth’ of Russians; the rediscovery of traditional Russian values. As the argument goes, the post-Soviet 
generation ‘lacks the moral fibre required of future heroes’.59 The need for spiritual rebirth is given 
strong emphasis in policy documents and has been very prominent in the patriotic discourse, where a 
number of policy actors have voiced variants of the reactionary moral cliché. In the early debates leading 
up to the program of patriotic education, the emphasis on ‘moral security’ was particularly strong.60 In 
this context, a sting towards stereotyped western values was common: Russia had lost its ‘true self’ to 
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the influx of alien ideas from the West. The official Concept of Patriotic Education captures this 
sentiment, and sees patriotic education as a remedy against widespread ‘indifference, egoism, 
individualism, cynicism, unmotivated aggression, disrespectful attitudes to the state and social 
institutions’. The Concept of Patriotic Education notably declares that the policy should aim to ‘establish 
conditions for the national rebirth of Russia as a great power’, a formulation for some reason absent in 
other texts. It expects from Russian patriots great sacrifice “to the point of death”, but offers little in 
return save for positive feelings of duty and pride.61 In short, the State Program is extremely ambitious 
but has rather few means to its disposal beyond stories and narratives.  
The heavy load put upon the two shoulders of past and present military glory helps explain the 
strong state involvement in the subject of history. It feeds on securitizing discourse, situating patriotism 
at the centre of the value universe, identifying threats and calling for wide-reaching measures. Not only 
do the plans call for the coordinated efforts of all state institutions on all levels, including not least the 
educational system. In addition, civil society has its part to play, and the use of mass media is central to 
the strategy. A range of talk shows, war movies and documentaries have explicit goals of building 
patriotism. The Ministry of Defence has its own TV-channel, Zvezda, exclusively dedicated to patriotic 
content, usually meaning Soviet cinema classics, musical events, cartoons and occasional 
documentaries.62 On the margins of the State Program, militaristic initiatives have mushroomed. Well-
known initiatives like the Iunarmia Youth Organization and the Park Patriot outside Moscow are but the 
most visible manifestations of a more comprehensive tendency. As in the State Program itself, the 
activities are frequently structured around popularized military history and celebrations. 
Indicative of a process of securitization, military actors have been directly involved in patriotic 
education policy development and implementation.63 The initiative to make a patriotic education a state 
priority belongs with the Russian military establishment, who since 1992 has had a special department 
for this form of indoctrination. Clearly, they have not simply been responding to a threat, but have 
themselves been participating in securitizing history and identity.64 Today, a whole range of state 
institutions contributes as partners to the project, including security actors such as the Federal Security 
Service (FSB) and the Ministry of Defence, but no academic institutions. Until 2016, a state organ for 
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nurturing civilian-military relationships was coordinating and leading the implementation of the five-
year plans.65 
Fighting Historical Falsifications 
Following the ‘history wars’, the Russian state has displayed increasing willingness to enforce its 
interpretation of historical events, primarily connected to the Great Patriotic War. In 2009, then 
President Dmitri Medvedev established a special Presidential Commission of the Russian Federation to 
Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interest (the Falsification 
Commission). It was formed in order to monitor attempts to revise the historical truth of the Second 
World War in an anti-Russian direction and to advice the President on how to counter them. The 
Commission chair, Sergei Naryshkin, envisioned it as an ‘organizational base to ensure the protection 
of our own history from dishonest attempts to distort it’.66 Tellingly, among the twenty-eight members, 
there were several employees from the power ministries, the Armed Forces and the Secret Services, but 
few independent historians.67  
While the commission was dissolved before it had achieved much, the initiative to battle anti-
Russian historical narratives lives on. While the Falsification Commission ceased to exist, the old tsarist 
institutions of Russian Historical Society (RIO) and the Russian Military-Historical Society (RVIO) 
were reborn only months later. RIO has a far broader mandate than the Falsification Commission, 
includes a wider range of partners, and is allegedly dedicated to an ‘objective and impartial study of 
historical events’.68 At the same time, RIO inherited from the commission the role of a state-led historical 
arbiter, taking on the responsibility to fight ‘dilettantism and attempts of falsification’.69 It also inherited 
the commission’s leader, Sergei Naryshkin, who now had freed up time on his schedule. The suppression 
of so-called historical falsifications also remains part of the patriotic education program, as well as other 
key documents such as the National Security Strategy and Concept of Foreign Policy.70 Reportedly, 
there is even a special task force within the Russian military where conscript-historians fight 
falsifications of the Second World War.71 
Another important event in the efforts to protect the official narrative by institutional means was 
a breakthrough in the lengthy attempts to pass a law to secure the ‘historical truths’ of the Great Patriotic 
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War. In 2014, the article 354.1 in the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation was born, which made it 
a criminal offense to rehabilitate Nazism and, more vaguely, to ‘spread information on military and 
memorial commemorative dates related to Russia’s defence that is clearly disrespectful of society and 
to publicly desecrate symbols of Russia’s military glory’. The article allows for considerable 
punishment; penalties up to 300,000 robles or equivalents of two years of salary, and up to three years’ 
incarceration. While some welcomed a more active stance against Holocaust deniers, the other phrases 
of the law provoked criticism.72 It was arguably overstepping an important line of state involvement in 
history, using legal measures to protect the state’s heroic narrative about itself. In the words of Mälksoo: 
‘Setting legal frames on how ‘our story’ can be remembered is, in a sense, the ultimate securitization, 
because it ‘ontologizes’ a particular story, making it an unchanging part of the state’s self-definition.’73 
Ultimately, the state puts to use its most powerful weapon, its theoretical monopoly on legitimate 
violence, to enforce its historical narrative. Because access to state channels in Russia is skewed and 
personal, however, the law also provoked fears of selective law enforcement, a reoccurring issue when 
it comes to anti-extremism and hate crime legislation.74 
In 2016, a Russian citizen was found guilty under the mentioned article for displaying 
‘profanities and expressions of negative attitude towards the St. George ribbon as a symbol of the 
Russian military glory’ 71. A few months later, another citizen was sentenced to a 200,000 rouble fine 
for reposting on social media what the SOVA institute finds to be ‘a free understanding of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact as well as a number of questionable statements relating to the Bandera movement’ 70. 
Among other strange moments that took place in the courtroom, the accused was confronted with his 
good marks in history class as evidence he should have known the article contained erroneous historical 
claims.75 
Several publicized episodes of what seemed like extra-legal enforcement of historical narratives 
also took place in Putin’s third term. In 2014, Andrei Zubov was fired from his job at the University of 
International Relations in Moscow, seemingly due to an article published in Vedomosti, where he drew 
parallels between the Crimea annexation and Nazi Germany’s Anschluss of Austria.76 Whether the 
episode can be attributed to state policy remains an open question. The next year, Sergei Mironenko, the 
director of the Russian State Archive, was reassigned (or relegated) following a quarrel with the minister 
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of culture, Vladimir Medinskii. Mironenko had been claiming that the Soviet story of the heroic 
Panfilovtsy was an historical myth and deliberate falsification by Soviet propaganda, and pointed to a 
previously classified document to support his claims.77 The minister’s involvement in the then soon-to-
be-released heroic movie of the 28 Panfilovtsy and with history policy in general, makes it plausible to 
interpret the relegation as political signal.78 Both parties, however, denied any connection between this 
quarrel and Mironenko’s reassignment.79 Other controversial cases from recent years include the 
stripping of historian Kirill Aleksandrov’s doctoral degree (on the anti-Soviet Vlasov movement in 
World War II) and the persecution of historian and local Memorial leader Yurii Dmitriev, apparently 
for his investigations into Stalinist terror.80 
Pragmatism, Contradictions, and Concessions 
While the main line of Putinist policy on national history is evident, the regime’s approach also contains 
important contradictions and concessions. Despite the paternalistic, idealizing and state-centred features 
of history policy, the Kremlin has also been trying to appease both liberals and conservatives. The 
irreconcilable ideological stands of liberals/westernizers and traditionalists, each with their own 
perceptions of ‘historical justice’, seem to be a semi-permanent feature of the Russian ideological 
landscape.81 In cases where construing a consensus is too far-fetched, then, authorities have seemingly 
pursued a policy of pluralism. Especially in the case of the politically sensitive issue of Stalinism and 
Stalinist repressions, state policy has had obvious elements of pragmatic manoeuvring and balancing. 
Several factors can explain policies that diverge from the assertive line reviewed above. 
Certainly, there is a temporal dimension: Establishment of an assertive main line in Putin’s first terms, 
followed by more liberal tendencies under Medvedev in 2008-2012, and finally a return to the main line 
in the wake of the 2014 Crimea annexation. Alternatively, we can focus on contradictions in the pursued 
policies, observing how a given policy actor frequently fails to be consistent in its acts and statements. 
Internal contradictions can be found in Putin’s speeches, in history textbooks or even in the patriotic 
education program. Finally, we can interpret the inconsistency in terms of concessions in order to satisfy 
particular agendas and appease the groups advocating them, be it Stalinists or liberals. In order to 
account for the complexities of Russian history policy, all these perspectives should be integrated. 
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Despite Medvedev’s de facto subordination to his patron Putin, his presidency in 2008-2012 
signalled a significant revision of the regime’s policy of history. The infamous Falsification Commission 
was established at this time, the first draft of the ‘history law’ appeared, and Medvedev hardly influenced 
the patriotic education programs. Other events and statements in the period, however, gave observers 
hope that history would be given back to historians or at least treated in a more relaxed manner. Historian 
Alexei Miller ended a 2011 article on a positive note: ‘Russia has escaped the outburst of historical 
policy that seemed inevitable in 2009.’82 With Putin’s return to presidency in 2012, however, such hopes 
were soon dispelled. The tightening of the screws in domestic politics in wake of the Crimea annexation, 
the Russian historian found, ‘fully manifested themselves in memory politics’.83 
In his review of Putin’s history policy, Kristian Gjerde emphasizes the complexity and 
incoherence of the Kremlin narrative, and the ways in which the Kremlin has mediated widely differing 
positions in order to reach historical consensus. Gjerde claims that conventional analyses of Russia’s 
history policy are ‘skewed’ and that the many contradictions are often overlooked.84 The infamous 
Filippov history textbooks provide the perfect illustration of internal inconsistencies, he states, as they 
borrow ‘phrases and explanatory models from widely different and incompatible narratives and world 
views’.85 
To be sure, the Russian policy of history seems both centrist and populist. Obviously, the policy 
makers have endorsed the Great Patriotic War not just because it was the best story for their purposes, 
but also because it resonated with the population. Although the Kremlin has paid concessions to both 
the liberal and the conservative camp, however, there has been little doubt as to the regime’s role as the 
ultimate arbiter of state policy. At the same time, Gjerde is clearly right about the Kremlin not being an 
extreme party in the debate over history and identity. Indeed, the existence of more authoritarian or hard-
liner approaches is vividly illustrated by examples in the introduction to this paper, and elite actors have 
raised explicit calls for a full-fledged state ideology. The liberal and nationalist-patriotic oppositions 
have both been attacking the Kremlin for what they see as manipulative policies to legitimize its own 
regime. Whereas the liberals accuse President Putin of rehabilitating Stalin, the communists accuse him 
of demonizing the dictator.86 By means of its history policy, the Kremlin purposefully tries to navigate 
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in this extremely polarized discursive landscape. The dependence upon the World War II mythology in 
history policy is not least due to the lack of alternative consensus-building topics. 
If the Great Patriotic War has been the perfect topic to highlight and harness Russian national 
consensus, the related issue of Stalinism remains a bone of fierce contention. Nowhere is the navigation 
on the ideological oceans of Russia harder than on the issue of Stalinism, and the Russian history policy 
reflects this. In its attempts to deal with the differing interpretations of Stalinism, official Russia has 
pursued a give-and-take policy, rife with contradiction and concessions to several agendas.  
Both elites and general public opinion are highly polarized with regard to the assessment of 
Stalin’s role in Russian history.87 Sociologist Boris Dubin suggested that there are in fact two Stalins in 
Russian historical consciousness: ‘Stalin the tyrant, and Stalin the victor in the Great Patriotic War’.88 
According to Dubin, there is a fundamental rupture between the two Stalins: Both images are popular, 
and there is no middle ground.89 Putin has himself commented on the dual role of Stalin: ‘Stalin was, of 
course, a dictator […] the problem is that it was under his leadership the country was victorious in World 
War II, and this war is to a large extent connected with his name.’90 Exactly for this reason, the Stalin 
question will remain a wellspring of dissonance in the official historical narrative for years to come. 
Much attention has been paid to the alleged rehabilitation of Stalin, not least in the cultural 
sphere.91 For a large part, active elite groups at the margins of power have been steering the process, 
fuelled by popular demand. At the same time, the Kremlin has accepted the development, and even 
supported it on a regional level.92 Controversial acts with policy ramifications include the renaming of 
streets to the memory of Stalin, rehabilitation of a Stalin homage on the Moscow metro, and the 
replacement of the famous Perm´ 36 Gulag-museum. The 2015 unveiling of a massive statue of the ‘Big 
Three’ (Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt) in Yalta was attended by Naryskhin personally.93 
Polls conducted by the Levada Center indicate a new surge in Stalin’s popularity since the 
Crimea annexation.94 Ivan Kurilla suggests that the conflictive relations with the West and the Kremlin’s 
concurrent flirt with Stalinism have combined to unleash an ‘avalanche effect that threatened to escape 
the Kremlin’s control’.95 Indeed, the Levada polls seem to support Kurilla’s suggestion that the 
expansion of Russian territory and conflictive relation with the West in one way or another triggered 
associations to Stalin’s image as Victor and Imperial leader. 
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In the years of the Putin and Medvedev presidencies, however, re-Stalinization initiatives have 
often been followed by corresponding de-Stalinization. Not only Stalin busts are erected, but also new 
monuments over Stalin’s victims. Both Putin and Medvedev have routinely condemned Stalinist 
totalitarianism.96 In 2015, the Concept of State Policy to Perpetuate the Memory of the Victims of 
Political Repression was signed; prominent liberal Mikhail Fedotov led the work. 97 This was not a full-
fledged process of coming to terms with the past, however, but rather an initiative to commemorate the 
victims of repression without confronting the origins and agents of the terror.98 Another notable piece 
of policy running counter to the main line is the so-called Concept of a New Educational-Methodological 
Complex on National History, which is interesting because it was adopted on Putin’s personal initiative 
in the midst of intensified authoritarianism. The concession to professional historians is clearly visible 
in this document, which pushes patriotism and military glory into the background and instead stresses 
Russia’s status ‘as a democratic law-based federal state’ to which ‘personal rights and freedoms are the 
highest values’.99 
While some concessions target the liberal camp, others target the Orthodox Church. A case in 
point is the Russia -- My History project, a series of large-scale and interactive ‘history parks’ built in 
more than 15 locations across the country, designed to foster patriotic sentiments among the young. The 
Russian Orthodox Church was heavily involved in the project. Its values and interests shine through in 
the exhibitions, and miracles are seamlessly integrated with other explanatory factors. The religious line 
is not least visible with respect to the Soviet and Stalinist period. The upshot is that Stalinism is both 
condemned (for its atheism and anti-religious persecution) and rehabilitated (for the 1930s return to 
national values, industrialization, and strengthening of the state).100  
In short, it seems incorrect to speak of a full-fledged rehabilitation of Stalinism under Putin’s 
presidency. As Gjerde puts it, ‘Stalin remains much more a problem than a resource in the search for a 
positive narrative.101 We can thus see how Russian history policy remains relatively flexible and able to 
reach out to professional historians and liberals even in the midst of a general authoritarian 
consolidation. The element of identity securitization, however, makes sure the historians do not step out 




Official Russia, as well as independent elite actors, have been painting a picture of a Russian national 
identity under threat, legitimizing state involvement in the field of history and collective identity 
formation. On several occasions, security actors have been involved in defining and enforcing ‘correct’ 
versions of historical events, pushing professional historians aside. The co-existence of this phenomenon 
with repeated calls to counter perceived threats against Russian national identity, traditional values and 
cultural sovereignty shows how Russian history has been undergoing a process of securitization. In our 
material, securitizing actors typically present a version of reality where much harm has already befallen 
Russian national identity. Efforts to secure this identity, therefore, coexist alongside efforts to roll back 
harmful influence. Because the envisioned threats against Russian national identity are not merely 
looming, but already wreaking havoc, the securitization of national identity leads to active and explicit 
attempts to mend it and restore a purported ‘natural’ identity.  
Since the turn of the millennium, the Kremlin’s history policy has mainly promoted a state-
centred and patriotic view of Russia’s past, and it has done so mainly with respect to the Great Patriotic 
War. Celebrating military achievements and favouring unifying narratives, the primary purpose of this 
policy has been to rally the nation around a positive and heroic memory -- to encourage respect and love 
for the Russian state, historically and today. Publicly expressed notions about existential threats to 
Russian identity have enabled Kremlin’s resort to heavy-handed tools in order to defend historical 
narratives against internal and external onslaught. 
Securitization efforts have not targeted all salient historical topics, however. In particular, 
Russian history policy has been less heavy-handed when relating to the contentious issue of Stalinism. 
Here, the approach has included concessions to liberal as well as neo-Stalinist viewpoints. The historical 
Stalin appears divisive, and therefore poorly fit to build societal consensus. The approach to Stalinism 
shows that the Kremlin is not simply enforcing one final version of history, but rather attempts to 
manoeuvre in a polarized ideological landscape. While Russia has become more openly authoritarian 
since Putin started on his third term in office, liberal initiatives still carry an impact, as do the neo-
Stalinist agenda. This does not imply that there is no structure or predictability to Russian history policy. 
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